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Abstract: The narrative dimension of the EaP programme was considered by the 
European policy makers of secondary relevance as it was focused on the 
bureaucratic aspects of the economic and judicial convergence of the target 
countries with the European Union through “regulation setting”. The importance 
of these aspects has clearly increased after the Russian Federation used hybrid 
war tactics in Ukraine since 2013 based on a fabricated Strategic Narrative that 
relied on the “Reflexive Control” and “Informational Warfare” principles to a 
great effect. The growingly opposing information spheres, the Russian and the 
European, have an enormous importance for the political discourse in the Eastern 
Partnership (EaP) countries. By drawing on a closer examination of a number of 
primary and secondary sources – including important events, official texts, and 
excerpts from interviews – this paper aims at comprehending the formation, 
projection and reception in the EaP states of the Strategic Narratives of the 
Russian Federation and the European Union since 2013. 
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Introduction 
 
Communication is more and more at the centre of the international scene. 
The constant evolution of the new media channels (i.e. the development of social 
networks) affects policies and their outcome. In fact, “definitions of policy 
problems usually have narrative structure; namely, they are stories with a 
beginning, middle, and an end, involving some change or transformation. They 
have heroes and villains and innocent victims, and they pit forces of evil against 
forces of good” (Stone, 2002, p. 138). The Eastern Partnership (EaP) region, its 
people, elite and civil society, are caught in-between. 
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The European and Russian Strategic Narratives are increasingly in contrast. 
The struggle of identities is transforming into an irreconcilable confrontation that 
European policy-makers, scholars and civil society have to address. After the 
Russian ‘middle class’ protests of 2011 and the Arab Spring events in the same 
year, the Russian Federation’s policy-making elite perceives any change in the 
‘near abroad’ as a direct threat to Russian sovereignty. In fact, “Kremlin’s policies 
towards the post-Soviet space range somewhere between domestic and foreign 
policy; they can be regarded as an extension of domestic politics” (Adomeit, 
2011, p. 25). The Russian intervention in Georgia in 2008, the ‘hybrid war’ 
enacted to seize Crimea in 2014 and the creation of the separatist entities in 
Luhansk and Donetsk are increasingly included in the Russian Strategic Narrative 
as rightful acts to oppose the larger Western offensive. The “Maidan-phobia” is 
currently one of the pillars of the wider Russian identity (Makarychev, 2013). 
Process tracing is the main research method employed in the present paper 
in order to capture the essence of the current aggressive merging of the Russian 
and European informational spheres in the EaP countries one. As the hybrid 
confrontation’s analysis underlines, the “Holmes’s method of elimination […], 
when the investigator has eliminated all plausible alternatives, the remaining 
scenario must be the correct one” (Collier, 2011, p. 827), process tracing becomes 
fundamental, being a particularly useful analytical tool.  
Based on Strategic Studies and Strategic Narrative Studies theory, the data 
provided offer a fresh and profound outlook on the recent events in the region. 
The main goal of this paper is the analysis of the implementation of a remodeled 
Strategic Narrative into the EaP programme, capable to re-engage the EaP states 
and the Russian Federation into dialogue, taking into account the current 
international stalemate. The confrontation level in the region, in fact, is assuming 
an existential dimension which has to be re-shaped to a more pragmatic nature. 
The European narrative projection needs to create a new synoptic judgment which 
will enable proper contexts and circumstances, in order to dialectically reverse the 
current regional zero-sum confrontation between local actors, the European Union 
and the Russian Federation.  
 
1. Russian Strategic Narrative: Stop? 
 
The annexation of the Crimean peninsula in 2014 was the culminating point 
of the shift within the Russian Federation towards a more traditionalist and 
conservative paradigm, cyclically returning throughout Russian history. The pre-
modern ‘holiness of un-freedom’ is supported by the technological 2.0 revolution 
of the 21st century, creating a unique Strategic narrative to defend the Russian 
interests at home and in the near neighbourhood. Andrei Kolesnikov (2015, p. 9) 
argues that “the 2010s offer one a simple choice: you are either for the regime and 
its satellites and its ideology, or you are against it”. Ever since the Communist 
era, there has been an established tradition of related studies in Russia, of 
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furtherly refine capabilities, in order to achieve specific objectives through 
principles as ‘Camouflage’ and ‘Reflexive control’. In fact, “how Russia positions 
itself in the Western media space and the deliberate closing of its own space is no 
accident […] the aim being to maintain cohesion at home while encouraging 
discord elsewhere” (Laity, 2015, p. 25). The point of view of the opposing 
“information spheres” play a huge role in Russia’s self-understanding, as well as 
in shaping the Russian approach towards the international scene. 
Reflexive control is based on a careful individuation of its methods and 
objectives. The development of the capacities to control and shape the ‘cognitive 
area’ of allies and adversaries was central to the Soviet Foreign policy: “One 
gains an advantage in conflict […] above all if one is able to influence the 
opponent’s perception of the situation […] and at the same time conceal from him 
the fact that one is influencing him” (Lefebvre et al., 1971, p. 45). The 
Communist party’s objective was to control society through manipulation and 
careful management of the information received by the Soviet citizens. 
Using historical legacy as the starting point, the Russian Federation made 
further advances to refine the scientific use of propaganda and ideology using the 
currently available technological means, involving even the highest levels of 
policy-making. The Ukrainian conflict was a perfect representation of this 
narrative approach. The modus operandi was based on hiding or manipulating 
information in order to achieve a strategic objective. When the situation on the 
international scene is changed and the evidence is overwhelming the truth can be 
revealed. Vladimir Putin, quite ironically, affirmed during his conference to the 
nation at the end of 2015: “we never said there were not people there who carried 
out certain tasks including in the military sphere” (Walker, 2015). There is no 
clear separation between the ‘Peace’ and ‘War’ narratives in the Russian 
approach, but a constant grey area. The process of militarization of information 
and narratives in the Russian Federation has a long history. Currently, these 
separations (war/peace, military/non-military) are taken to an entirely new 
qualitative level. Bogdanov et al. (2013) studies on the new generation warfare, 
for example, are going in that new qualitative direction. Media, religious 
organizations, cultural institutions, NGOs, financed public movements and 
scholars are described as non-military elements used to defend the Russian 
interests. The main battlefield of the future becomes the information and 
ideological sphere (Bogdanov et al., p. 18). Therefore, the Russian Strategic 
Narrative in the EaP region is evolving as a part of the overall evolution of the 
Russian Grand Strategy which is adopting an effects-based operational road-map 
from the unique heritage of the Soviet Union’s theoretic studies.  
This represents a complex challenge for scholars and analysts as “effects-
based operations are conceived and planned in a systems’ framework that 
considers the full range of direct, indirect, and cascading effects […] achieved by 
the application of military, diplomatic, psychological and economic instruments” 
(Davis, 2001, p. 7). In fact, while Kremlin perceives several European member-
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states (i.e. Germany, Italy, France, Greece, and Hungary) still as potential 
strategic partners, in the current international context, the European Union as a 
whole is considered as a rival bloc. The EaP region is considered as the area of 
direct rivalries. In sum, “Russia wants to recreate the erstwhile world order in 
which Moscow plays a major role again, and it’s strategy is to cultivate fear of 
Russia (as it has been Russia’s historical culture) to force submission from their 
rivals” (Kakachia, 2010, p. 89). The refinement of the aforementioned narrative is 
at the centre of the Russian strategy.  
The end of the summer of 2013 was the turning point for the zero-sum 
game between Russia and the European Union in the EaP region. As Wohlforth 
(1995) underlines, it is difficult to uncover the decision-makers’ assessments of 
power which is crucial for the outbreak of hegemonic rivalry. Armenia was the 
initial target, as it was the country on which Russia held the biggest leverage. “In 
a single day Moscow sent a message to the inhabitants of an entire region that 
they do not have a choice - that their independence is arbitrary” (Cathcart, 2013) 
thus commencing a flexible narrative, that goes beyond the geopolitical game at 
play. The traditional multipolar perspective was brought to an entirely new level. 
The Russian Federation’s sponsored Eurasian Union (EEU) was increasingly 
perceived as incompatible with the European Union. Consequently, “a lack of 
shared understanding of what constitutes and should constitute acceptable rules 
and behaviour could lead to competing and conflicting interpretations and 
strategies” (Hurrel, 2007). For instance, the EU-EEU rivalry was also one of the 
factors that added up to the escalation of the Ukrainian conflict. Interestingly, the 
Russian strategic narrative targeted areas way beyond the political or economic 
spheres, as for example “gender and gay rights have become geopolitical […] 
Armenia’s LGBT people are seen as an existential threat to the nation, agents of 
enemies past and present” (Nikoghosyan, 2016). Thus, a completely new game 
with different rules emerged. Russian Strategic Narrative directly uses proxies on 
the ground in the targeted countries for local support, through different levels of 
sub-narratives that together back up the Russian goals. Moreover, any interference 
of Russia is negated and is maintained at the unofficial level. Igor Dodon, for 
example, the leader of the Socialist party in Moldova, in an interview in 2013 
affirmed: “I have quite good relationships there [in Russia], but they have nothing 
to do with the funding of political ideas, but rather with the bilateral and personal 
relationship with different entities in the Russian Federation” (Tribuna, 2013). 
Nevertheless, his political discourse is based on the “Western masters” narrative1 
and he vowed several times to “end the European experiment in our country” 
(Socor, 2014).  This is another present feature of the Russian Strategic narrative, 
as the Kremlin’s sponsored international news multi-media channels attempt to 
divide and rule through support and diffusion of claims based on ‘Western world’ 
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criticism. The fervent focus on the flaws of the pro-European political forces is 
never held towards the Russian institutions. Moreover, the audience is broad as 
the broadcasts go not only towards the Russian-speaking minorities but equally to 
the European public itself, with broadcasts in English language.  
History and time itself is being stretched in the Russian Strategic narrative 
efforts to re-create the understanding of the audience and ultimately to re-channel 
it. It should be noted that “time becomes human to the extent that it is articulated 
through a narrative mode, and narrative attains its full meaning when it becomes a 
condition of temporal experience” (Ricoeur, 1984, p. 52). Russian Strategic 
narrative is directed to hijack the interpretation of the historic trajectory itself of 
the EaP region, for domestic, local and European audiences. The Ukrainian 
conflict’s understanding was re-created in this way, especially within the 
Novorossiya narrative: 
According to the Kremlin version of Ukrainian history, Novorossiya 
consists of lands which were colonized by Russians in the eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries. The cities of Novorossiya are said to have all 
been founded by Russians and populated by Russians. […] In reality, 
the regions claimed as Novorossiya have been imperial borderlands 
and melting pots for centuries, attracting a wide range of settlers 
including Greeks, Germans, Bulgarians, Jews, Armenians and 
countless other communities including ethnic Russians (Dzherdzh, 
2014). 
The EaP region’s identity itself is being transformed, especially by 
changing the casual explanation of the current events. An explanation fitting the 
Russian geopolitical actions and strategy emerges with the exposition of the 
naturalness of how one thing led to another, how one thing followed another “as a 
matter of course” (Humphreys, 2010, p. 14). Thus, the events in the region are 
portrayed as part of a larger Eurasian ‘awakening of conscience’. 
Another salient characteristic of the Russian Strategic Narrative is 
consequently a dialectic transformation of the coloured revolutions (the 
Revolution of Roses in Georgia in 2003, the Orange Revolution in Ukraine in 
2004 and 2005, and the Maidan itself in 2013 and 2014). Integrating with the 
concept that  
Defence is used in Aesopian terms to address issues of offence. […] 
Russian media and diplomatic sources have kept up an incessant 
campaign to characterize the ‘Banderite’ government in Kyiv as 
illegitimate and brutal. Cyberspace was not immune, as ‘patriotic 
hackers’ attacked Ukrainian banks and government websites. The 
essence of this non-linear war is, as Gerasimov says, that the war is 
everywhere (Galeotti, 2014).  
In the tradition of the Reflexive control-based operations, the events are 
portrayed in a suitable key. “Today Ukraine stands before a choice – to go on the 
way of peace and constructive dialogue in the society – or to go down to 
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authoritarianism and a national-radical tyranny (Embassy of the Russian 
Federation in the Republic of Moldova, 2015). The same reasoning can be applied 
to other countries of the EaP region in the current Russian perspective. The 
conflictual perceptions of the Ukraine crisis in Russia and the West are in fact 
motivating the Russian population and minorities for a better identification with 
Putin’s Russia, as a struggle for Russian survival:  
The result of the information brainwash is that the word 
‘Russian’ in Ukraine causes rejection, they begin to hate us. This is 
thanks to the efforts of the United States, the efforts being made by the 
European Union, which are trying to bring us, Russians, to our knees” 
(The Siberian Times, 2015).  
The Russian Strategic narrative leaves quite little space for maneuver and 
dialogue. Even Azerbaijan, far from the Euro-aspirations of other countries of 
EaP, is under pressure from the Russian mass media. The reason is the pressure 
on the Russian minorities from the government (Pravda, 2013). This is a 
reoccurring dimension of the Russian Strategic narrative. The leader of the 
Russian minority and member of the Milli Mejlis, Mihail Zabelin, directly 
addressed the issue saying that: “We, the members of the Russian minority of 
Azerbaijan, completely don’t agree and we are deeply outraged by the fictional 
informational, lies and slander, which were diffused in the Russian and 
Azerbaijani means of mass information on behalf of our name”2 (The Federal 
Lezgin National-Cultural Autonomy3, 2013). Similarly, in Ukraine the Russian 
Strategic narrative’s included misinformation does not affect the local Russian 
minorities as much as the domestic public, which is its main target. 
We have created our myth. The myth is a faith, it is passion. It is not 
necessary that it shall be a reality. It is a reality by the fact that it is a 
good, a hope, a faith, that it is courage. […] And to this myth, to this 
grandeur, that we wish to translate into a complete reality, we 
subordinate all the rest” (Baumer, 1978, p. 21).  
To sum it up, the Russian Strategic narrative in the EaP region intertwines 
the absence of reality and the projection of National grandeur. It directly targets 
the vulnerable strings of the domestic public and Russian minorities abroad, using 
the Russo-phobia as a tool to accomplish geopolitical goals with mixed results. 
Moreover, it allows the Russian policy-making elites to estrange themselves from 
the reality and persists on the path that started to materialize in the early 2000s.   
 
2. Strategic narrative of the European Union: Slow. 
 
The European Neighbourhood Policy and the Eastern Partnership initiatives 
were conceived on the grounds of sharing the same interests, ideas and values in 
                                                     
2 Translation of the author 
3 Translation of the author 
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EU’s near abroad. The main goal to achieve in the region were building 
democratic and open market economies which would provide the ground for 
future EU’s eventual enlargement. In fact, EU’s  narrative consisted of a 
revolutionary “new vision of an enlarged area of peace, stability and prosperity 
encompassing the wider neighbourhood of the EU, a circle of friends, a shared 
neighbourhood founded on common values” (Wissels, 2006, p. 1). Nevertheless, 
despite EU’s ambitious goals, its narrative’s essence was condemned to erode in 
the following years, as it was shaped by its fostering of the “institutional 
emulation” (Börzel et. al., 2007) and lacking a political dimension. The Russian 
growing assertiveness and opposing Strategic narrative was the main reason for 
its narrative’s erosion in 2013, with the Ukrainian events and the Crimean 
annexation.  
“Peace, stability and prosperity” were substituted with one keyword, 
“Stabilisation” (Tomčíková, 2016), which became in fact, the lacking dimension 
of the neighbouring regions in the eyes of the European Union’s policy makers.  
“Against its will, the EU was slipping into a geopolitical competition with 
Russia, a scenario for which it was badly prepared” (Lehne, 2014), lacking a 
coherent and solid narrative to address the emerged challenges. The European 
Union was facing a ‘zero-sum’ game, instead of the ‘win-win’ scenario of the 
‘Big Bang’ enlargement of 2004, in a profoundly different region. Biscop (2014) 
considered that EU has learnt the hard way “the geopolitical implications of 
technical cooperation, export of norms and trade relations the hard way”. Thus, 
following the Ukrainian crisis, EU’s response was ‘defensive’ based on sanctions 
policy, support of the pro-Western government and condemnation of the Crimean 
annexation. Although it seemed adequate, it did not offer a clear and immediate 
resolution towards the de-evolution of the security situation in Eastern 
neighbourhood. The current “frozen” state of the EU’s Strategic narrative is a 
direct product of this realization and a mirror of the many “frozen” conflicts that 
plagues the region. 
The European Strategic narrative was considerably shaped by its ambiguity 
and lack of coherence towards the EaP members, especially in its narrative arc.  
Moreover, for the EaP countries, there is simply no stimulus to actually apply the 
internal reforms which the EU requires, whereas EU’s main challenge was the 
lack of knowledge to coherently frame its own interests, as “we can know what 
our interest are […] only if we can first settle the question of who or what we are 
ourselves” (Ringmar, 1996, p. 52). For instance, the democratic criteria were 
rigorously applied to Belarus as no ‘vital interest’ was at stake, while Azerbaijan, 
a major energy partner and important for the “Southern Corridor” project, with 
equally authoritarian practices was treated with considerable tolerance, in 
comparison. Moreover, despite being supposedly closely aligned to Putin, 
Lukashenka provided means to reach out to the post-Maidan Ukraine and address 
the security instability. Vladimir Makey, the Belarusian foreign minister, directly 
asks to “openly acknowledge that the situation in Belarus compared to several 
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countries [including those in the EaP] is no worse and in many regards is even 
better than in these countries” (Goble, 2014).  
The lack of coherence and clear objectives in the region are not the only 
hick-ups of the EU’s actions and narrative in the EaP countries. For instance, 
Armenia’s position in the European Strategic narrative equally raises certain 
perplexities. The main issue is the fact that “there is also a gap between the EU’s 
desired and actual role in the South Caucasus. […] it is clear that its interest in the 
region is primarily energy driven” (Babayan et al., 2011, p. 5). Therefore, the 
EU’s strategic narrative has mainly failed to address the Armenian population and 
its civil society. Currently, “the EU needs to explore alternative measures to 
engage and empower embattled Armenia, but based on a more realistic 
recognition of the limits and liabilities” (Giragosian, 2015). The European Union 
has to offer a solid narrative that is able to shape the perception not only of 
domestic public but also to re-wire the Russian take on the actions of the civil 
society in the region. For example, in 2015 “Armenians took to streets whenever 
they felt that their government neglected their interests and rights and continued 
to ignore its pledge to transparency in decision-making” (Babayan, 2015). The US 
narrative take on the protests can even more radicalize the Russian media 
response. The main element of the protests is that “contemporary Armenian civil 
society is not only about elite NGOs, but also about self-organized, grassroots 
movements” (Mikhelidze, 2015, p. 8). The European Union has to address such 
events not only in Armenia but also throughout the EaP region, in order to be able 
to guarantee a truly independent coverage. The EaP initiative has to be based on 
enabling “vulnerable communities themselves to create the conditions for peace 
and stability” (Kaldor et al., 2008, p. 3) and therefore answer the “who” question 
(Stryker, 1996, p. 335). Especially in the case of Ukraine, “Brussels should 
gradually engage in comprehensive outreach to the grassroots – a process that is 
not well-known to the EU” (Shumylo-Tapiola, 2013), although this engagement is 
vital for the European Strategic narrative. 
Moreover, the communication aspects are in fact critical to the success of 
the EU’s overall Strategic narrative, but also for the entire EaP initiative. Without 
a doubt, “effective communication is an essential part of successful policies, 
productive initiatives, mutually beneficial partnerships or cooperation projects” 
(Kimber et al., 2015, p. 5). The efforts to increase communication capacity in 
order to enhance EU’s capacities have also to be subtle, considering that the last 
decade the EU-Russia dialogue regarding the EaP has been characterised bya 
“combination of worst-case assumptions about one another’s intent with best-case 
assumptions about one another’s will”, which “encourages escalation on both 
sides” (Saunders, 2014). Moreover, there is an urgent need to foster in the EaP 
members the feelings that “Europe is a state of mind” (European Commission, 
2013) for them too, thus creating “spill-over” effects through effective strategic 
communication. The local population’s perceptions regarding the European EaP 
initiative are not particularly encouraging, as, only 51.1 per cent of respondents 
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believe that the EaP has created any progress. Moreover, in bolstering the pro-
reform cause in partner countries, “the EaP received the fairly low approval rating 
of 58.8 per cent” (Dostál, 2015). Therefore, the local population has to understand 
what the European Union stands for convincingly, in a better way.    
The nature of European economic projects, security and foreign policy has 
to be intelligible and open for the public, especially for the citizens of the EaP 
region. “Connection, contest and (un)complexity” (Fricke, 2015) are three 
dimensions that have to be answered continuously. While the following initiatives 
adaptively integrate with the European wider narrative, these ideas have to be 
absorbed in the EaP larger frame, in linguistic and accessibility terms, not only to 
the elites but also to the uneducated population. “In other words, to get to an 
alternative future, you have to create a story about the past that connects to it” 
(Kaplan et al., 2016) and create the historic connection to Europe is paramount 
for the EaP initiative. “Constant fluidity” has to be the quality to pursue for EU to 
adapt to the characteristics of the region.  
The European Strategic narrative therefore is shaped by the overall 
European Strategic culture. Longhurst (2004, p. 17) points out that: 
A strategic culture is persistent over time, tending to outlast the era of 
its inception, although it is not a permanent or static feature. It is 
shaped and influenced by formative periods and can alter, either 
fundamentally or piecemeal, at critical junctures in that collective’s 
experiences. 
The European Strategic narrative is affected by a certain degree of self-
absorption on the part of the European Union. Nevertheless, this uncanny 
dimension is hard to capture. Venus identity does not identify the essence of the 
issue (Coss, 2002), especially in the EaP region; Mercury is a more precise 
identification of this “light-footed” approach. There is a clear lack of 
understanding that the interdependences, especially in information space, in the 
post-modern world, are not exclusively positive. Such expanding environment can 
be better exploited by an aggressive international actor. “Illusion of validity” 
(Zaiman, 2011) can jeopardize the capacity to realistically individuate the 
priorities that the European Strategic narrative has to follow. The EU’s 
instruments in this regard are only being shaped and they have to be consolidated.  
Another important element of the strategic narrative is the end-state. The 
weakness of the European Strategic narrative in this sense is plain to see. The 
worst option is “the continuation of the indefinite, vague and drifting policies 
towards the region, underpinned by the large diversity of the countries in 
question” (Novák, 2015). The European Union’s unique identity has to be 
preserved through persistently trying to re-frame the chessboard itself and 
adapting to the changing conditions. It is fundamental to respect -in the 
framework of the EaP initiative- the fact that “the more a story takes cultural, 
personal, role-specific, religious and media structural expectations into account, 
the more tangible and relevant and, thus, the more understood and accepted it 
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becomes” (White Paper, 2014, p. 11). In this context, the EaP has to become a 
credible story for the people of Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Ukraine, Georgia 
and Moldova. 
 
3. Russian and European Strategic narratives re-configuration: Go! 
 
The Russian Strategic narrative assertiveness should highlight the European 
Strategic narrative’s need for consistent transformations, and ultimately motivate 
the EU to take action in order to shape a new “re-configuration” in the EaP 
region. The initial priority becomes to re-tune the European approach to address 
the fact that in the post-modern world “due to the non-systemic nature of the 
global mind-space one cannot trace, however, all the casual relationships and 
intolerant elements from this non-system, but only seduce these elements to 
change their behaviour” (Sirén, 2013, p. 210). The new European Strategic 
narrative priority towards the Russian narrative should be an increased 
pragmatism, the realization of the finite nature of the means and possibilities in 
such a complex environment. Simpson (2012, p. 116) identified the nature of 
strategy itself in these chaotic connections: “Essentially, strategy is a dialectical 
relationship, or the dialogue, between desire and possibility. At the core of 
strategy is inevitably the problem of whether desire or possibility comes first.” 
Laity (2015, p. 27) clearly identifies the dimensions of the EaP initiative Strategic 
narrative re-branding, related to desire and possibility: 
1. Our problem/situation is Russia challenging the existing European 
security and seeking to re-establish spheres of interest; 2.Our 
desire/objective is to protect that order; 3. Our actions/execution are 
what we are doing now and decide to do in the future; 4. In order to 
reach our happy ending/end state, where all Europe’s nations 
(including Russia), large and small, can have secure borders and make 
their own choices, based on mutual respect and accepted rules. 
The European approach to EaP region has to deeply understand the 
complex system this region represents and that events in a similar initial situation 
can evolve in profoundly diverse end-states and “exhibit erratic behaviour through 
disproportionally large or disproportionately small outputs” (Beyerechen, Winter 
1992-1993, p. 62). It is exactly the reason why fluidity has to become the 
preeminent feature of the European Strategic narrative. A sober assessment is 
needed, as “it is foolish to think now that a more confident Russia, bent on 
asserting its interests in Eastern Europe and the Middle East, is beyond the 
reaches of productive engagement” (Starobin, 2015). While retaining the realistic 
evaluation of the Russian actions, the European Strategic narrative has to create a 
possible constructive position for Russia in the region, delicately ‘surfing around’ 
vital issues that immediately evoke ‘the spiral of hostility’. The greatest mistake 
would be to turn to Russia as the ‘Other’ on the World scene. The content that the 
European Strategic narrative provides can push the regional situation further away 
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from a dialogue-based structure. “For a number of European nations, national 
pride may be a long forgotten concept, and sovereignty is something they can't 
afford. But for Russia genuine state sovereignty is an absolutely necessary 
prerequisite for existence” (Putin, 2014) and the capacity to understand such 
elements of the Russian identity is the key for successful points of contact 
between European and Russian communication spheres.  
Major events assume the significance for both narratives as strategic 
episodes, each of which is relevant for the final fate of both. It is relevant to 
underline that strategy and strategic episodes “both are mechanisms to give 
meaning to actions in attempts to win the mind, only strategic episodes truly 
answer the question for strategy” (Garard, 2016). The events and the hostile 
actions from state and non-state actors in the post-modern world are inextricably 
becoming more and more “dynamic, unpredictable, diverse, fluid, networked, and 
constantly evolving” (Pfaltzgraff Jr et al., 2016). The capability to build a chain, 
in which the individual rings connect themselves is the practice which should be 
adopted. The European Strategic narrative is its people, the staff that represents 
the EU in the region and the pro-European locals.  
Narrative has to be translated into reality. In fact, “practices are forms of 
behaviour with regard to strategy that have become institutionalised and can thus 
be seen as having a degree of stability and routineness in an organisational setting, 
although they may vary in their specific performance” (Fenton et al., 2008). The 
EaP initiative has therefore undergone ulterior restructuration through innovative 
practices. The European Strategic narrative inclusion of “everyday” local stories, 
based on the principles of inclusion and transparency, is a fundamental step. 
Achieve “coexistence in time and space of both ordering and disordering 
narratives […] to create the desired order” (Pedersen et al., 2012, p. 15) should 
also enrich the adaptation potential of the overall European Strategic narrative.  
The goal is to achieve a situation which could enable even a partial “re-
inclusion” of the Russian informational sphere into the European Strategic 
narrative. The concept of “comprehending a complex event by ‘seeing things 
together’ in a total and synoptic judgment” (Mink, 1966, p. 42) is interesting to 
explore in this sense. Importantly, “a synoptic judgment is a single and self-
contained act of understanding which does not contain temporal sequence” (Mink, 
1966, p. 43) and allows a more coherent re-structuring of the interpretation of 
events. “Moving ahead […] perhaps calls for a differentiated ‘3-1-2’ approach, in 
response to the different circumstances the EU faces” (Hug, 2015, p. 19) and 
could perhaps include Russian Federation as the +1 partner, remaining firmly 
committed to the values that the European Strategic Narrative stands for. While 
adopting this approach, cohesion to impede “political actions in some EU 
countries expressing admiration for Putin as a strong man who is unafraid to 
resort to military might, and whose ‘macho-nationalism’ seeks to dictate the fate 
of others” (Bildt, 2015) is the priority, as a fractured Strategic narrative is no 
narrative at all. Moreover, since the “lack of trust is a direct consequence of 
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Russian aggression, not Western miscommunication” (Dehez, 2016), a firm 
commitment to have a common voice emerges as the “centre of gravity” of the 
European Strategic narrative, towards the EaP partners and Russia itself.  
Clausewitz addresses the issue stating that “a certain centre of gravity 
develops, the hub of all power and movement, on which everything depends” on 
(Clausewitz, 1989). Describing centres of gravity, which are not physically 
existing, is quite difficult: “moral centres of gravity are less obvious. Yet, it is 
essential to understand them since they are likely to be more important on the 
strategic level” (Strange et al., 2004, p. 27). EaP initiative’s success is based on 
the capacity of the European Union member states to speak with one voice 
towards the target countries. Still, it is important to underline that, for the 
European Strategic narrative to be successful,  “elements of this kind of job, such 
as security sector reform and intelligence, might be better suited for member 
states acting bilaterally or in groups rather than for the European Commission” 
(Leonard et al., 2014, p. 6). Therefore, while the member states have to be 
encouraged to participate in the European Strategic narrative, as they can integrate 
it in a quicker fashion, elements that can foster and justify aggressive actions from 
the Russian side have to be avoided.  
 
Conclusions 
 
“The great risk, though, is that Europe and Russia find themselves in a film 
noir, where the villain’s plot fails but takes everyone down with it.” (Leonard et 
al., 2014, p. 6)  
“A strategic narrative is necessary to create a logical framework, a pattern 
of meaning” (Tobias, 1989, p. 5). Considering the European approach towards its 
Eastern neighbours, a change is required. The European Strategic narrative has to 
include all six partners, on a tailored-made basis. In this context, the words of the 
foreign minister of Poland, Witold Waszczykowski sounds particularly true: “We 
should think about the future of six states of very different status. We should 
decide whether to divide the program or to preserve, but to offer an individual 
cooperation agreement to every member” (Hartyja ’97, 2016). The EaP initiative 
has to transform even more in a shared journey. “It’s more than a value 
proposition of what you deliver to them. Or, a mission of what you do for the 
world. It’s the journey that you are on with them” (Bonchek, 2016) and a clear 
destination has to be provided. 
As Dmitri Trenin quite correctly points out, there is a dire and impelling 
need to renew the European Strategic Narrative in the EaP in the light of a 
historic-political trajectory: “The new normal of alienation and estrangement is 
here to stay. It is impossible to say how long, but likely a number of years. The 
Ukraine crisis of 2014 was not a product of miscalculation or misunderstanding. It 
grew out of the failure of Russia’s integration into the West following the end of 
the Cold War, the collapse of the Communist system and the dissolution of the 
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Soviet Union” (2016). 
The EU and the EaP states’ leadership have to pursue a coherent and 
pragmatic path for Europeanisation, thus avoiding to perceive the EU 
commitment to EaP against the EaP countries’engagement with Russia, as if these 
were two counterbalancing options; with the probable exception of Ukraine. A 
long-term perspective has to be adopted, in order to answer to the question: what 
kind of states does the EaP initiative wish to create? Overcoming the deeper 
source of tension, the antagonistic fracturing of the population between the EU 
and Russia in the EaP countries, should be the goal of the European Strategic 
Narrative. Challenges, such as the general culture of intolerance or the 
disproportionate power of law-enforcement agencies, have also to be eventually 
addressed in its framework.  
A new systematic re-alignment in the region is emerging. Strategic 
Narrative is a political roadmap which is constructed in three phases: status quo, 
conflict and the creation of a new situation. The European re-engagement in the 
region has to pass this Rubicon in order to continue to achieve meaningful results 
and turn the current trend. In fact, the European Union’s priorities are realistically 
“managing the running conflicts rather than resolving them, while preventing 
dangerous accidents; learning the fine art of cooperation within confrontation, in 
those few cases where the convergence of both sides’ interests is compelling” 
(Trenin, 2016). Likewise, it has to continue to invite all actors concerned. It is 
quite clear that “the Union can no longer allow itself to operate in ad hoc 
manner,[…], if it hopes to achieve any strategic objective” (Coelmont, 2012, p. 
3), although re-framing the European Strategic narrative faces the Russian 
challenge, which could prove to be either an obstacle or an opportunity for the 
EaP initiative and its future.  
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